In a recent Devar Torah (matter in Torah) by Rabbi Shlomo Riskin in the Jerusalem Post (by now all Mind readers must have realised JPost is my preferred source of news on Israel and the Jewish world), a particular point was very well put. The whole entry was excellent (on parashat Pinhas).
“[...L]et us review the events in Numbers: The Israelites have begun to commit harlotry with the Moabite women, justifying their immorality by attaching themselves to the hedonistic philosophy of Baal Peor – “It’s good if it feels good; whatever is natural is positive.” [Emphasis added] God then instructs Moses, and Moses instructs the judges to execute all the leaders of this idolatrous wave.
But at that very moment a prince of the tribe of Shimon publicly fornicates with a Midianite woman – daring Moses, whose own wife was a Midianite – to punish him. Moses is momentarily paralyzed. The entire nation is aghast at the impudent rebellion; the elders are weeping at the Tent of Meeting. Phinehas, usually a respected and peaceful mediator, understands that if he does not act at once, Moses and his divine laws will have been silenced and Jewish history will end, so he is forced to step out of character for the ultimate good – and peace – of the nation.”
Just a few days ago, someone opined, regarding a particular negative mitzvah: “…but what if they see no wrong in it? …[if the action] was just something so completely natural [to them] that they do not perceive it as unholy.”
This ties in with the Friday night conversation from the Maccabiah post. If something is natural, then it’s a good, or so the logic goes. The above exchange takes it one step further: If something is perceived as completely natural to them, then how can it be a bad?
These views reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Judaism’s philosophical stance regarding the nature of G-d, G-d’s relationship to the world, and consequently the required relationship between mankind, its world, and its Creator.
My knowledge on this comes from a few places such as a particularly brilliant interview with Dennis Prager on moral relativity and the need for an Absolute G-d for the proper functioning of society (Ultimate Issues Spring Summer 1986 pp. 4-8 and 26-27) and Rabbi Ezra Bick from his excellent “Topics in Medieval Jewish Philosophy” series available under “Machshava” on the Ki Mitziyon Tetze Torah website.
Maimonides asserts that G-d is different than, separate from, and independent of anything we could possibly know within creation*. Indeed he says there are only three things we can know about G-d, the rest is impossible. Instead of having a relative god, simply “greater than” its creation, you believe in an absolute G-d, utterly beyond His creation in any and every way imaginable – the ultimate Other. This is the point I needed to draw out. And this is the crucial factor for the moral system of Judaism.
It doesn’t matter one iota whether an individual feels that an action is right or wrong, forbidden or permissable (for all or even just for him), rather, if the law derives from the Absolute is that X is forbidden, then X is forbidden. Whilst Judaism considers the different feelings of individuals in the manner of the law’s application (the nature and/or degree of the application etc**), nonetheless the law itself does not change depending on the whims and wit of society in one era or another, from one place or another, or from one person to another. This is the only valid way we can make judgements on Earth. Everyone must be held up to the same moral standard, and that moral standard, just as its Author, is immutable, unchanging, and absolute. Via moral relativism, everything and anything is permissable. This is the essential characteristic of polytheism as well – pick the god you like, and his or her moral standard with it. And if your god is defeated by another god… all that garbage.
G-d dictates our moral sensitivities, not the other way around.
The Riskin comments about the hedonistic philosophy of Baal Peor can be applied in this context: it is foreign to – and stands completely at odds with – real Judaism, of that we can be sure.
Torah – in my experience – is always timely.
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* But this is not to suggest that G-d does not know us. By definition, G-d being infinite implies a perfect knowledge of the minutiae of our lives, and this knowledge brings about both reverence and love, ideally at once. Reverence because you realise that G-d knows what you’re doing and will hold you accountable – He cares, and love because G-d’s knowing about you and the smallest goings on within your existence mean He can help, and often does help, if your eyes are open and you have a developed sense of gratitude.
Many wish to banish G-d, (Hass V’Shalom, G-d forbid to think such) to the farthest Heavens, such that you can go about your business. Then those people want to complain that G-d is so far away, how can we possibly reach him? Some religions then create intermediaries to act as emmisaries for our requests, others turn that feeling of abandonment – towards abandoning morality, like what often happens if a parent never disciplines a child.
Still others want to consider G-d as the un-knowing Creator, as a way to invalidate G-d as having to answer for the injustice and pain that occurs (Lo Aleinu). This latter thought I can understand and feel for emotionally. Very deeply. But intellectually I cannot accept it. G-d is infinite. He cannot not care. The question of Tzaddiq Ve-Ra’ Lo, Rasha’ V’Tov Lo (why bad things happen to good people) remains, and as Rabbi Benjamin Blech says in his lecture series on Aishaudio by the same name, there may be answers, but there isn’t one definitive answer.
** The example that springs to mind is in tractate Makkoth (lashes), where if a person about to be lashed is so distressed by the impending blows that he or she urinates, publicly, the embarrassment arising from this is such that were it to have taken place even before the first blow, none would be given. This is off the top of my head and may not be 100% accurate nor may this principle cover all circumstances.
In discussing how Halacha can change from country to country, society to society, era to era and individual to individual, Rabbi Mark Dratch at Yeshiva University described it like a equation, whereby “x + y = ” is the law that never changes, but the inputs to those variables can and do change all the time depending on circumstances, yielding different legal outcomes. This is the true nature of flexible Judaism that does not break with tradition – it does not and never needed to compromise one centimetre.
